Abstract
The present study, with a critical approach, analyzes and evaluates the “community of inquiry” as the methodological core of the Philosophy for Children program, based on the foundations of transcendental wisdom and with emphasis on the epistemological status of the faculty of imagination. To this end, it first explains the ontological and epistemological foundations of Sadra’i philosophy, including the substantial motion of the soul, the stages of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception, the mediating and foundational role of the faculty of imagination, and the genetic and epistemological relation between imagination and intellect. Then, the presuppositions and mechanisms of the community of inquiry are critiqued based on this framework. Findings indicate that the dominant emphasis of this method on dialogical rationality, argumentation, and linguistic-logical skills is not fully consistent with the Sadra’i conception of the genetic and perceptual stages of the soul and the foundational role of the faculty of imagination in the process of knowledge. From the perspective of transcendental wisdom, neglecting the mediating role of imagination can lead to reducing its function to a tool for facilitating learning, hastening the transition from sensory and imaginal stages to intellection, and creating discontinuity among the learner’s perceptual stages. Accordingly, rethinking the Philosophy for Children program requires attention to the existential structure and perceptual capacities of the learner and a redefinition of the role of the faculty of imagination in relation to intellect.


Synopsis
The Philosophy for Children (P4C) program, developed by Matthew Lipman in the 1970s, regards philosophical inquiry as a collaborative and dialogical activity through which children are encouraged to ask questions, examine ideas, provide reasons, and develop critical thinking skills (Lipman, 1991, 2003). One of the central methodological components of this program is the “Community of Inquiry,” in which children engage in collective discussion of philosophical questions, often prompted by stories and narrative situations. Although this approach has contributed to the development of dialogical and argumentative skills, its underlying assumptions about the nature of the child, the process of knowing, and the relationship between imagination and reason require further philosophical examination.
The present study critically examines the Community of Inquiry from the perspective of Sadra'i philosophy, with particular emphasis on the epistemological status of the faculty of imagination. Its central concern is whether the dialogical and argument-oriented structure of this method adequately corresponds to the existential and cognitive development of the learner, as understood within Transcendent Philosophy. More specifically, the study investigates the relationship between the Community of Inquiry's emphasis on reasoning and verbal argumentation and the Sadra'i account of the gradual development of the human soul through the levels of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception.
This research is a fundamental theoretical study conducted through a descriptive-analytical approach and based on documentary and library research. Its materials are drawn from three groups of sources: the foundational writings of the Philosophy for Children program, particularly Lipman's works; primary and interpretive sources in Sadra'i philosophy; and contemporary studies addressing the relationship between Islamic philosophy and philosophical education for children. The analysis proceeds by examining the principal assumptions and mechanisms of the Community of Inquiry, identifying the relevant ontological and epistemological principles of Sadra'i philosophy, and critically comparing the two approaches. The comparison focuses particularly on their respective understandings of cognitive development, the role of narrative and imagination, and the nature of rational activity.
The theoretical framework of the study is grounded in several interconnected principles of Sadra'i philosophy. The first is the principle of the substantial motion of the soul, according to which the human soul is not a fixed entity but undergoes continuous existential development. Human growth, therefore, cannot be reduced to biological maturation or chronological age; it also involves the gradual actualization of perceptual capacities and the formation of intellectual and moral dispositions (Sadra, 1981; Motahhari, 2010). From this perspective, education is not merely the transmission of information or the acquisition of particular skills. Rather, it is a process that can contribute to the existential development of the learner. Consequently, educational activities, especially those involving abstract philosophical concepts, should take account of the learner's actual perceptual capacities while also providing opportunities for their gradual development.
The second principle concerns the three principal levels of human perception: sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception. Sensory perception is associated with material objects and particular experiences. Imaginal perception, although no longer dependent on the immediate presence of material objects, retains particular forms and provides the soul with the capacity to preserve, reproduce, combine, and create images. Intellectual perception, in turn, concerns universal concepts and abstract meanings (Sadra, 1981). These levels are not merely separate cognitive techniques; they are related to the gradual development of the soul. Within this framework, imagination has a significant mediating position between sensory experience and intellectual understanding. Its development is therefore important for the formation of the capacities required for more abstract forms of thought.
The third principle concerns the epistemological and educational functions of imagination. In Sadra'i philosophy, imagination cannot be regarded merely as a temporary instrument for attracting attention or facilitating learning. It is an essential level of perception through which meanings can take imaginal forms and become accessible to the learner. Narratives, symbols, and imaginative representations can thus provide more than an initial stimulus for discussion: they can contribute to the learner's encounter with meanings at the imaginal level. In connection with the principle of the unity of the knower and the known, the study also emphasizes that knowing should not be reduced to the storage of information; it involves a relation between the soul and the object of knowledge (Sadra, 1981). From this perspective, imaginative experience can provide a basis for subsequent intellectual analysis.
A further aspect of the theoretical framework is the relationship between imagination and intellect. In Sadra'i philosophy, these faculties should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Although imagination has a prior and mediating role in the developmental movement toward intellectual perception, reason can subsequently guide and regulate imaginative activity. The educational issue, therefore, is neither the unrestricted encouragement of imagination nor its suppression in favor of abstract reasoning. Rather, it concerns the gradual cultivation of imagination and its appropriate relationship with intellect (Javadi Amoli, 2005; HosseinPoor, 2013).
On the basis of this framework, the study identifies several points of tension between Sadra'i philosophy and the dominant structure of the Community of Inquiry. First, the emphasis on dialogical reasoning, logical judgment, and argumentative participation may presuppose a degree of readiness for abstract intellectual activity without sufficiently considering the gradual development of the learner's perceptual capacities. From the perspective of Sadra'i philosophy, intellectual reasoning should not be treated as the immediate starting point of philosophical education, since the development of the soul involves interconnected perceptual levels. An insufficient consideration of these levels may result in a premature transition to abstract reasoning and a superficial or predominantly verbal understanding of philosophical concepts.
Second, the role assigned to stories and imaginative situations in the Community of Inquiry requires reconsideration. In the conventional structure of the program, narratives often function as stimuli for initiating philosophical discussion and providing material for subsequent questioning and argumentation (Lipman, 2003). However, from the Sadra'i perspective, the educational and epistemological significance of imagination cannot be exhausted by this introductory function. Narrative and imaginative forms may contribute directly to the learner's perception and internalization of meanings. Reducing them to motivational devices risks overlooking the distinctive role of imagination in the process of knowing.
Third, the transition from sensory and narrative experiences to abstract discussion may fail to preserve sufficient continuity among the levels of perception. If the imaginal dimension of experience is not adequately developed, philosophical concepts may become subjects of verbal discussion before they have acquired sufficient depth in the learner's perceptual experience. This concern is particularly significant when abstract concepts are discussed primarily through logical definitions and argumentative exchanges, without sufficient attention to the experiential and imaginal dimensions through which those concepts may become meaningful.
Fourth, the emphasis on verbal expression, logical argument, and the ability to criticize the views of others may privilege the linguistic form of participation over the depth of understanding. From the perspective of Sadra'i philosophy, genuine knowledge is connected with the development of the soul and cannot be identified solely with the ability to formulate arguments or manipulate concepts verbally. Accordingly, the study questions whether the predominance of linguistic and logical performance in the Community of Inquiry adequately reflects the broader dimensions of intellectual and existential development.
Finally, the study draws attention to the relationship between imagination and intellect. Although the Community of Inquiry makes use of stories and imaginative situations, its principal emphasis is placed on the external examination of ideas through dialogue and reasoning. The Sadra'i framework, by contrast, highlights the importance of the relationship between the cultivation of imagination and its subsequent guidance by intellect. Insufficient attention to this relationship may result either in the neglect of imagination or in imaginative activity that is not adequately integrated with rational judgment.
Conclusion
The findings indicate that the differences between the Community of Inquiry and Sadra'i philosophy extend beyond educational techniques and concern more fundamental assumptions about human nature, knowledge, and the process of cognitive development. While the Community of Inquiry places considerable emphasis on dialogue, argumentation, and the development of logical and critical thinking skills, Sadra'i philosophy understands education in relation to the gradual existential development of the soul and the interconnected levels of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception.
The central finding of this study is that the faculty of imagination occupies an essential epistemological position within the Sadra'i account of human knowing. It is not simply a preliminary or motivational instrument that can be set aside once verbal discussion begins. Rather, it constitutes an important mediating level through which sensory experiences and particular forms can contribute to the development of intellectual understanding. Consequently, insufficient attention to imagination may weaken the continuity between perceptual levels and encourage a premature emphasis on abstract reasoning.
The analysis also shows that the Community of Inquiry's emphasis on argumentative and linguistic performance raises questions about the relationship between verbal competence and deeper understanding. From the perspective of Sadra'i philosophy, the educational value of philosophical activity cannot be assessed exclusively through the learner's ability to express reasons, formulate judgments, or participate in logical discussion. It must also be considered in relation to the development of perceptual capacities and the learner's gradual engagement with meaning.
These criticisms do not amount to an outright rejection of dialogue, questioning, or collaborative inquiry. Rather, they indicate the need to examine the philosophical assumptions underlying these practices and to assess their suitability in relation to the learner's existential and perceptual capacities. The principal contribution of the present study is therefore to shift the critical examination of the Philosophy for Children program toward the epistemological status of imagination and its relationship with the developmental structure of the human soul.
In conclusion, Sadra'i philosophy provides a theoretical framework for identifying certain limitations in the dominant emphasis of the Community of Inquiry on dialogical rationality and argumentative skills. It highlights the importance of considering the continuity of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception, recognizing the epistemological role of imagination, and examining its reciprocal relationship with intellect. Such considerations can contribute to a more philosophically grounded assessment of the foundations and educational implications of the Philosophy for Children program.